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Серия: Экономическая >
Випуск 1 (11) >
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http://ea.donntu.ru/handle/123456789/29349
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| Название: | КОМПЕНСАЦИЯ КАК ЭФФЕКТИВНАЯ ФОРМА ГРАЖДАНСКО-ПРАВОВОГО ПРИНУЖДЕНИЯ |
| Другие названия: | Compensation as the Effective Form of Civil Law Enforcement |
| Авторы: | Шмаков, А.В.
Shmakov, A.V. |
| Ключевые слова: | институциональная экономика
институты
меры гражданско-правового принуждения
компенсация
эффективность компенсации
гражданское право
экономический анализ права
civil law enforcement
compensation
compensation effectiveness
civil law
economic analysis of law |
| Дата публикации: | 2014 |
| Издатель: | ДонНТУ |
| Библиографическое описание: | Наукові праці Донецького національного технічного університету. Серія: Економічна. №1 (11) / ДВНЗ "ДонНТУ" ; редкол.: В.В. Дементьєв (голов. ред.) та ін. - Донецьк : ДВНЗ "ДонНТУ", 2014. |
| Аннотация: | Оценивается оптимальность выбора компенсации как формы гражданско-правового принуждения. Приводятся рекомендации по совершенствованию механизма компенсации. Компенсация рассматривается не только как средство
возмещения потерь, но и как цена нарушения закона, правильное определение которой способствует достижению экономической эффективности. В центре внимания находятся проблема воздействия компенсации на поведение людей, создания эффективных стимулов к принятию мер предосторожности. В статье рассматривается широкий круг вопросов, связанных с функционированием механизма компенсации: методы расчета компенсации, подходы к решению дилеммы «эффективность-справедливость», пути преодоления парадокса компенсации, методы определения оптимального уровня мер предосторожности и оптимальной степени
доверия. |
| Описание: | The paper estimates the optimal use of compensation as a form of civil law enforcement, designed to ensure the functioning of the institutions
responsible for the regulation of property rights. The property rights are considered in accordance with S.Pejović and E.Furubotna`s approach in the broad
economic sense as " the right to use and the right to receive income from material objects or intellectual activities, as well as the right to demand certain behavior from other individuals."
The work covers a wide range of issues related to the functioning of compensation mechanism: economic nature of compensation, compensation advantages over other forms of civil law enforcement, basic principles of determining the optimal amount of compensation, ways of overcoming the
compensation paradox, methods for determining the optimal level of precautions and optimal credibility, approaches to solving the "efficiency - equity" dilemma, ways of improving the compensation mechanism.
Compensation is considered not only as a
means to compensate for losses and restore justice, but as the price for breaching the law, the correct determination of which contributes to the achievement of economic efficiency. The focus is on the problem of compensation effect on people's behavior, creating effective incentives to take precautions.
Thus, compensation is seen as a mechanism to create incentives, which is used to implement security function in its broadest sense. The main purpose of compensation is to lower the economic inefficiency of breaching the law.
The basic principles for determining optimal
compensation in terms of maximizing the social welfare function are: effective incentives for risk prevention by compensation, elimination of compensation paradox, absence of excessive precautions`
stimulation, justice consistency. Optimal compensation should foster effective incentives to prevent the risk of adverse outcomes for all parties involved in
the process: the offender, the victim and the state. An effective amount of compensation should be determined as the ratio of the expenses required to prevent damage to the likelihood that the loss-maker
will pay compensation for his illegal acts.
However, the amount of compensation calculated by this method may be higher than the size of damage, which will provoke the damaged to reduce precautions below the optimal level. To solve this problem - the compensation paradox – it is recommended to give the damaged only the part of compensation payment equal to the size of damage. Further reduction of the sum given to the damaged will contradict the principle of justice. The other part equal to the surplus of compensation relative to the
size of damage and necessary to prevent illegal behaviour should be confiscated. Assigning the function of determining compensation to the jurisdiction
in accordance with legitimate procedures should ensure the absence of distorting influence on the mechanism proposed by the executive power. Implementation of the principle of non-stimulation of excessive precautions, in addition to the principles of "unjustifiable confidence" and "rea-sonable risk" can contribute to the introduction of economic approach into the legal practice the practice for determining optimal standards of behaviour and combining norms of negligence widely used in
Western Europe and the U.S. Practical implementation of the proposed principles requires open discussion and further comprehensive assessment of the expected economic effect and the elaboration of legal technique |
| URI: | http://ea.donntu.org/handle/123456789/29349 |
| Располагается в коллекциях: | Випуск 1 (11)
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