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Випуск 1 (11) >
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| Название: | «РЫНКИ ВЛАСТИ» И ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКАЯ ПОЛИТИКА В СОВРЕМЕННОЙ РОССИИ |
| Другие названия: | "Power Markets" and Economic Policy in Modern Russia |
| Авторы: | Левин, С.Н.
Levin, S.N. |
| Ключевые слова: | институциональная теория
рынки власти
«политизированные» бюрократы
«политизированные» предприниматели
экономическая политика
market power
"politicized" bureaucrats
"politicized" entrepreneurs
economic policy |
| Дата публикации: | 2014 |
| Издатель: | ДонНТУ |
| Библиографическое описание: | Наукові праці Донецького національного технічного університету. Серія: Економічна. №1 (11) / ДВНЗ "ДонНТУ" ; редкол.: В.В. Дементьєв (голов. ред.) та ін. - Донецьк : ДВНЗ "ДонНТУ", 2014. |
| Аннотация: | Дается характеристика взаимосвязей
между структурой «рынков власти» и характером экономической политики в современной России. Показано, что основными субъектам и сложившегося в стране гибридного политико-бюрократического рынка являются «политизированные» бюрократы и «политизированные» предприниматели. В рамках такой системы принципиально меняется характер экономической политики. На формальном уровне идет конкуренция между двумя альтернативными моделями экономической политики: либеральной и дирижистской. На уровне реальной политики они трансформируются в «бюрократический»
«либерализм для своих» и «бюрократический»
«дирижизм для своих». При этом место целостных механизмов интеграции и стимулирования экономики (либерального или дирижистского) занимает режим «ручного управления» экономикой |
| Описание: | The current state of the Russian economy is characterized by the fact that the potential of the "reconstructive" of growth has been almost exhausted. This raises the question of the model and the institutional framework of economic policy, which would provide diversification and increased competitiveness of the national economy on the basis of its innovative transformation. At the same moment there was seem ingly paradoxical situation where low efficiency demonstrate traditional instrum ents as "liberal" and "dirigistic" economic policy. This situation is due to institutional factors that determine the character of the national "governm ent" and "business" and the specific features of their intera ction.
The purpose of this study is to characterize
the relationships between the structure of the "authority markets" and the nature of economic policy in modern Russia.
In modern Russia, instead of the planned separation of economic and political markets there occurred transformation of the Soviet administrative market into the post-Soviet political and bureaucratic (political and administrative) one, which is an "institutional hybrid" connecting the elements of status "trading" and classical political markets. Its characteristic features are:
1) The actual m erging of political, bureaucratic and economic "trades" in their formal separation.
2) Counter "bureaucratization" of political
and economic transactions, and the "politicization" of bureaucratic and economic "trading." "Bureaucratization" is that the competitiveness of the actors
in politics and business is determined by their status in the power hierarchy. On the other hand, the "bureaucrats" and "entrepreneurs" behave as "politicians", guided by their political (power) resource.
This leads to the fact that, on the one hand, publicpoliticians, acting as agents of the voters, are almost completely superseded from the system, and, on the other hand, the "rational bureaucracy, focused on the effective im plementation of administrative functions. As a result, the main actors of the domestic political and bureaucratic market are "politicized" bureaucrats and "politicized" entrepreneurs.
Such a system fundamentally changes the nature of economic policy. Sustainable difference between its form and the actual content arises. On a formal level, there is a competition between two alternative models of economic policy: a liberal and dirigistic. However, at the level of the "real" economic policies, the access of business both to "freedoms" and to "preferences" is defined by the presence of political resources, and is of fundamentally
selective character. And the subject of political decision making is a ruling politicized bureaucracy.
Based on the foregoing, the real m odels of economic policy can be defined as "bureaucratic" "liberalism for their own" and "bureaucratic" "dirigisme for
their own". The "bureaucratic" nature of the economic policy is that in the "public" choice system, the domestic politicized bureaucracy acts not as an agent of voters and public policy makers, but the
final principal. Interpretation of economic policy types as "liberalism for their own" and "dirigisme for their own" introduced by analogy with the concept of "crony capitalism". This m eans that entrepreneurs as the main object of economic policy get
access both to "freedoms" and state "preferences", selectively, with the deciding factor being the size of
the accumulated political resource. The problem is that it does not form a holistic
integration mechanisms and stimulate the economy neither of the liberal type, built on competitive markets and favorable business climate, nor dirigisme,
providing for taking the functions of determining development priorities and harmonization of private interests by the state. Their place is taken by mode of
"manual control" over economy, oriented mainly on short-term solution of local problems (action in the "fire brigade" mode). |
| URI: | http://ea.donntu.org/handle/123456789/29330 |
| Располагается в коллекциях: | Випуск 1 (11)
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