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Випуск 2(44) >
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http://ea.donntu.ru/handle/123456789/27987
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Название: | Інституційний монополізм або роль держави в системі відносин ринкової влади в Україні |
Другие названия: | Институциональный монополизм или роль государства в системе отношений рыночной власти в Украине The institutional monopoly or the role of the state in the market power relationship in Ukraine |
Авторы: | Герасименко, А.Г. Gerasymenko, A.G. |
Ключевые слова: | інституціональний монополізм ринкова влада держава державні закупівлі державна допомога institutional monopoly market power state public procurement state aid институциональный монополизм рыночная власть государство государственные закупки государственная помощь |
Дата публикации: | 2013 |
Издатель: | ДонНТУ |
Библиографическое описание: | Наукові праці Донецького національного технічного університету. Серія: економічна. Випуск 2(44) - Донецьк, ДонНТУ, 2013. |
Аннотация: | На основі аналізу існуючих досліджень сутності інституційного монополізму запропоновано розглядати останній у рамках моделі тріади влади (суб'єкт ринкової влади -> держава -> об'єкт ринкової влади), де держава виконує роль агента і каталізатора ринкової влади в системі міжфірмової взаємодії. Приведено емпіричне підтвердження поширеності такої моделі інституційного монополізму в економіці України. |
Описание: | The paper summarizes the results of the analysis of existing studies of the institutional monopoly essence, focuses on two key aspects that form the foundation for studying this economic category. The first is to determine the causes of monopoly, which in contrast to the usual monopoly is not the structure of the market, but the availability of special rights, uncharacteristic of other market participants. The second is in the subject dualism of this monopoly. Entrepreneurial monopoly combines features both of the subject of coercion, and of the recipient of the benefits from using it. In the case of institutional monopoly the functions of enforcement and benefit are shared among various actors: one defines the rules, unequal competition in the market, and the other uses economic rents resulting from them.
Based on the fact that most researchers consider the state as the main source of institutional monopolies and G.Stigler even goes further, describing the state as a mechanism of amorphous, customizable subjects of market power in a way that allows them to maximize the economic rent, as well as using the terminology proposed by A. Oleynik, there is a clear border between two types of monopolies: the business and institutional. If the entrepreneurial monopoly is organized in the framework of the power dyad (the subject of market power->the object of market power), the institutional one is organized as part of the power triad of (the subject of market -> the state -> the object of market power), where the state plays the role of an agent and a catalyst of market power in the relationship between companies, the carrier of market power with firms lacking such power.
In order to confirm the existence and operation of such a model of the institutional monopoly in Ukraine there are given the results of several empirical studies. For example, the comparative dynamics of the share of non-competitive public procurement in the overall costs to the dynamics of monopoly market share in the Ukrainian economy. Since the non-competitive procurement mechanisms exist for those cases where competition between suppliers is not possible or practical, including due to a natural monopoly status of a number of markets, it would be logical to get at least approximate equality of shares of non-competitive procurement and monopoly markets. In reality, the difference between the rates is more than significant, ranging from 10% to 44%. At the same time, the share of non-competitive procurement alignment to the share of the markets in which the presence of market power of individual entities is confirmed statistically, gives a much smaller error - at an average of -0.73%, indicating a merger of the market power with the state power in Ukraine, or more precisely - the capture of the latter by the owners of the market power.
Similar conclusions are made by the research institute for government assistance in Ukraine. Sectoral analysis of the state aid distribution shows that its main recipients are highly concentrated sectors of the domestic economy, in which the concentration of industrial production is at least two times, and then six times higher than the weighted average of the level of industry concentration in Ukraine. And this is an argument in favor of not only the prevalence of institutional monopoly in Ukraine, but also in favor of its organization to the triad of power, led by companies endowed with market power. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the statistical analysis of regional state aid, which, instead of being sent to backward, depressed regions is sent to regions -leaders of the national ranking of regional competitiveness.
Thus, this study allowed not only outlining some organizational model of institutional monopoly, but also testing its functionality by the example of the Ukrainian economy. |
URI: | http://ea.donntu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/27987 |
ISSN: | УДК 338.24(477) |
Располагается в коллекциях: | Випуск 2(44)
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