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Серия: Экономическая >
Випуск 2(44) >
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| Название: | Визначення умов дотримання аґентами неявних самовиконуваних угод |
| Другие названия: | Определение условий соблюдения агентами неявных самовыполняемыхс оглашений
Determining the conditions of the agents’ compliance with of the implicin self-enforcing agreements |
| Авторы: | Соколовський, Д.Б.
Соколовский, Д.Б.
Sokolovskyi, D.B. |
| Ключевые слова: | теорія угод
самовиконувана угода
ігрова модель
проблема“зайця”
теория контрактов
самовыполняемое соглашение
игровая модель
проблема “зайца”
contract theory
self-running agreement
game model
the “hitchhiker’s” problem |
| Дата публикации: | 2013 |
| Издатель: | ДонНТУ |
| Библиографическое описание: | Наукові праці Донецького національного технічного університету. Серія: економічна. Випуск 2(44) - Донецьк, ДонНТУ, 2013. |
| Аннотация: | Статтю присвячено виділенню формальних умов, за яких раціонально налаштовані взаємодіючі суб’єкти схилятимуться до дотримання неявної угоди між ними. Побудовано ігрову модель взаємовідносин суб’єктів і знайдено значення платіжної функції, за яких має місце нешева рівновага в чистих стратегіях «виконувати угоду». Показано,що зазначена задача є двоїстою до задачі розподілу колективних благ («проблеми “зайця”»). |
| Описание: | The paper justifies the selection of formal conditions under which the rational-minded actors will tend to observe the implicit contract between them.
Over the past few decades, the various concepts of the contract have been stabilized and offered a number of classifications. One of the main is division of all the contracts into three groups: agency contracts (contract type "principal
- agent" - a contract of employment, as well as its generalization to the agents’ "horizontal" relations - the contract of sale), incomplete (implicit) and implicit contracts (self-running agreement).
The problem of self-fulfilling agreements occupies an important place in the new institutional economics. Agreements of this type are characterized by inappropriateness of arbitration support, primarily due to too high transaction costs of such support.
The theory of self-fulfilling agreements is largely based on the concept of reputation. On the other hand, it is still an underdeveloped area of research of self-fulfilling agreements categories, and reputation does not operate directly. That is, the question is: can there be such conditions for the relationship of agents, in which compliance with the agreement will be beneficial to both of them without them having a priori information?
The game theory, which is the most appropriate tool for the problems of this type, has been selected as the main method for investigating the problem. The game model of subjects’ rela-tionships has been built and the value of the payment functions for which there is Nash equilibrium in pure strategies "to carry out the contract." It is proved that in order for agents to carry out the contract was profitable, it is necessary that the ratio of volume investment does not exceed cost efficiency of the agreement execution.
It is shown that the game, which simulates the relationship of generally equal partners, is also a model of the relationship of agents, which can lead to a "hitch-hiker problem" in the theory of collective goods. That is the solution of this game is also a solution to the "hitch-hiker problem", by specifying the parameters of the system in which for a rationally oriented subject it is not profitable to become a "free rider".
The novelty of the study results is to obtain an analytical expression for the automatic compliance with the agreement conditions by rationally acting cognitively perfect agents and formal proof of their adequacy. There is demonstrated the dual tasks of self-fulfilling agreements and the «hitch-hiker problem" in the allocation of collective goods.
The proof of the tasks duality of seemingly different fields of study (theory of contracts and market failure) suggests the existence of common roots of these areas, which in itself is the certain scientific result in these areas of institutional economic theory. At the same time, the ability to analyze the behavior of economic agents, for example, in matters of free-riding by relatively simple but quite formal tools of the game theory makes results presented in the paper useful from a practical point of view.
The main direction of this problem’s fur-ther development is its generalization for an arbitrary number of interacting entities, i.e. expansion of the "self-running agreement" to the interaction of any finite number of agents: the construction of the model and the proof of the adequacy of the obtained values of the relationship system’s parameters. It is also interesting to analyze the possibility to achieve practically conditions for self-fulfillment of agreements between agents in terms of specific practical problems of the real economy, e.g. in the areas of environmental-economic management, administration, etc. |
| URI: | http://ea.donntu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/27984 |
| Располагается в коллекциях: | Випуск 2(44)
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