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http://ea.donntu.ru/handle/123456789/31296
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| Название: | Сімейно-кланова організація домогосподарств у системі суспільних владних інститутів |
| Другие названия: | Clannish Family Households’ Organization in the System of the State Power Institutions |
| Авторы: | Зухба, О.М.
Zukhba, E N. |
| Ключевые слова: | домогосподарство
державна влада
інституційна система
домохозяйство
государственная власть
институциональная система
household
state power
institutional system
кланова система
clan system
структура організації суспільства
structure of society
organization of human society |
| Дата публикации: | 2014 |
| Издатель: | ДонНТУ |
| Библиографическое описание: | Наукові праці Донецького національного технічного університету. Серія: Економічна. №3 / ДВНЗ "ДонНТУ" ; редкол.: В.В. Дементьєв (голов. ред.) та ін. - Донецьк : ДВНЗ "ДонНТУ", 2014. |
| Аннотация: | На основі інституційного аналізу досліджені інституційні причини виникнення кланових структур організації суспільства та форми
їх прояву. Доведено, що їх функціонування викликано потребою ефективної реалізації інтересів
окремих домогосподарств , які прагнуть максимізувати результати своєї діяльності. Показано,
що кланова система організації соціального устрою дозволяє домогосподарствам протистояти
тиску інших інститутів - держави і фірм, і в
той же час використовувати їх механізми. Інститут кланової влади, будучи протилежним по
суті демократії, не вступає з останньою в антагонізм і успішно з нею поєднується. Встановлена залежність кланових основ владних відносин з явищами корупції та тінізації економіки. |
| Описание: | The essential platform for the institutional organization of human society stands on the definite
system of the relations of its agents. There is the
common idea in the economic literature that the institutional mechanisms for national economy regulation are dictated by the importance to achieve particular aims by particular agents. In addition there is
no definite sector for the household in the system of
state power institutions notwithstanding the im-portance of this research.
The importance of this subject is determined
by the fact that in the economic agents triad “state-firm-household” the latter is considered to be secondary or passive but household’s key position in
the national economy is obvious as it mediates almost all social economic relations, holds consumer
monopoly on the labor market, capital market and
the other resources and influences all the economic
and social processes. Therefore the scientific analysis is required to conduct the research and optimization of the institutional mechanisms and the realization of its interests.
Each of the institutional agents of the national
household (state, firms, households) has self-interest, connected with the performance of their
functions and opts the adequate model for power
realization.
State is based on command and administration system and firm applies the market one. From
our perspective households use two basic models:
clannish model is for the economically “strong”
households and democratic institution is for the
“weak” ones.
The historical conditions for clannish family
power mechanism, the criteria for clans’ formation
are analyzed in this article and the examples of
modern world clannish relations are given. For example despite the vivid clannish models that are
popular in Asia this model of state power relations is
found in western countries as well as in Russia and
Ukraine.
The article shows the forms of clannish relations like career protection, special access to limited
resources (“good contacts”), individualized
healthcare, educational, legal, social services, widespread “power directives” during election campaigns.
It is underlined that clannish family model for
the national household management cannot be opposed to the market or state models as the latter are
more effective from social perspective but clannish
state power institution is compatible with them,
promoting shady schemes and corrupt practices.
The basic reason and economic privilege of
clannish power is individualization of the population according to national, religious, territorial and other criteria and in the modern world the primary criterion is income and access to resources.
According to the Elite theory by Mosca, Pareto and Michels, clannish type of relations in power
does not only contradict democratic standards but it
also successfully associates with them: the real victory in democratic elections is determined by the
level of candidates’ income, the influence level of
supportive social groups, the level of education, religious status, origin. From our perspective the democratic institution is considered as a particular security mechanism for the interests of “weak” households that lack power and resources and cannot
stand against the clans but try to oppose them
through the political and social institutions including state. In their turn “strong” households also use
democratic instruments in their favor, primarily relying on clannish autocratic mechanisms.
To sum up clannish family mechanism for the
formation of the elite in power is effective enough
and it helps particular families to get the sustainable
access to the unique national resources through
state and market institutions. What is more clannish
system contrasting democracy by its nature is compatible enough with it. The recognition and research
of clannish organization of the society and its role in
the redistribution of power, resources and income
will make those processes more manageable and
state social policy more direct. |
| URI: | http://ea.donntu.org/handle/123456789/31296 |
| Располагается в коллекциях: | Випуск 3
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